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Assumptions and Unintended Consequences
of Florida's HB 87 and the Foreclosure
Crisis: A Pragmatic Analysis
Caroline Joan S. Picart* & Marlowe Fox**
ABSTRACT
Florida's Fair Foreclosure Act, House Bill 87 ("HB 87"), is a
legislative enactment that expedites the foreclosure process in Florida.
The rationale is simple: the sooner the foreclosure mess is cleaned up,
the sooner the housing market and economy can recover. Despite the
idea's inherent soundness, HB 87 makes assumptions that will lead to
unintended consequences.
This Article analyzes HB 87 in terms of its constituent elements
and, through legal reasoning, deduces the legal rights and duties created
thereby. We then use the rights and duties created by HB 87 as a
premise to infer the competing policies behind HB 87's rationale.
Lastly, this Article attempts an economic analysis of HB 87's rationale to
determine if its pragmatic effects are consistent herewith.
This Article concludes that the uncertain consequences of the
mortgage foreclosure crisis are best mitigated by affording the time
inherent in the legal process and maintaining the elasticity of courts to
make judgments based on interpretative case law and equity.
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INTRODUCTION
Friday, June 7, 2013. Five days before the bill would have
automatically become law, Governor Rick Scott signed House Bill 87,
An Act Relating to Mortgage Foreclosures ("HB 87").' HB 87 became
law on the date it was signed, although most of the provisions took effect
on July 1, 2013.2 House Bill 87 introduced changes in rules of civil
procedure governing the foreclosure process; in short, it speeds up the
foreclosure process.3 In the following sections, we explore the rationale
behind HB 87, demonstrate HB 87's inherent inconsistencies, and
forecast some unintended consequences.
This Article explores HB 87 in a three-fold manner: from within,
from without, and from above. From within, this Article's analysis will
1. Shawn M. Yesner, HB 87 - Speedy Foreclosures Come to Florida, YESNER
LAW (July 2, 2013), http://yesnerlaw.com/hb-87-speedy-foreclosures-come-to-florida/.
2. Id.
3. Toluse Olorunnipa, New Florida Bill Would Speed up the Foreclosure Process,
MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/01/04/3167640/new-
florida-bill-would-speed-up.html.
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be based largely on legal doctrine and legal reasoning.4 From the
outside, this Article analyzes HB 87 from an economic perspective.
From above, this Article explores HB 87 from policy-oriented and rights-
related frameworks; specifically, it analyzes HB 87's attempt to balance
the competing policies of efficiency versus justice and utilitarianism
versus individual rights.
Part I explains how HB 87 has been rhetorically framed in the
media and sets up the key theses of this Article. Part II provides a legal
analysis of the constituent elements of HB 87. By analyzing the legal
rights and duties created by HB 87, this Article aims to draw out the
competing policies behind HB 87. In addition, this Article analyzes the
House of Representatives Final Bill Analysis and points out some crucial
weaknesses. One such glaring weakness i that the Florida Legislature's
analysis is based on non-credible data from RealtyTrac.5 The Florida
Legislature's failure to scrutinize the RealtyTrac data probably indicates
bureaucratic posturing-taking a position merely for its political
advantages.
Part III attempts to provide a method-based economic analysis of
HB 87, borrowing from the fields of uncertainty theory and cognitive
psychology.6 From there, the Article analyzes the larger philosophical
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 2 (2004). For a similar
breakdown on different types of analysis, see Yesner, supra note 1.
5. RealtyTrac, according to its website, is "the leading provider of comprehensive
housing data and analytics for the real estate and financial services industries, Federal,
State and local governments, academic institutions, and the media." About RealtyTrac,
REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/company-info (last visited June 4, 2014).
6. "Uncertainty theory," as used in this article, is derived from John Maynard
Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Keynes distinguished
between "uncertain knowledge," which has "no scientific basis on which to form any
calculable probability whatever" and "calculable risk," which does. John Maynard
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 214 (1937)
[hereinafter Keynes, General Theory]. The ambiguity is partially in Keynes' work. He
speaks of "extreme uncertainty," implying some kind of continuum, but the majority of
the time, when he talks about "uncertainty," he is referring to something beyond the pale
of what is calculable or predictable. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 85-86, 91, 100, 104, 108, 116, 156 (1936)
[hereinafter KEYNES, INTEREST AND MONEY]. Of course, in a real world setting, the key
issue is isolating "uncertain knowledge" from "calculable risk"-if they can indeed be
completely and neatly parsed apart, even if they interact with each other as variables.
Examples of uncertainty include "the prospect of a European war[,] ... or the
price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system of 1970."
Keynes, General Theory, supra, at 214. Yet despite uncertainty, economic actors behave
as if they had "good Benthamite calculations of a series of prospective advantages and
disadvantages, each multiplied by its inappropriate probability, waiting to be summed."
Id. The practical offshoot of such reasoning is that "investment decisions are often made
in a setting of uncertainty, because by the time the investment can begin to yield a return
the conditions determining its profitability may have changed." RICHARD A. POSNER,
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
questions involved in HB 87, including its underlying policies. Without
making ex-ante normative judgments about these policies, this Article
looks to the pragmatic and foreseeable consequences of promoting one
policy over another.
In Frontiers of Legal Theory, Richard Posner breaks down
economics into two basic conceptions: the subject matter-based study of
markets and the method-based rational-actor model of human behavior.7
Posner notes that the latter seems to be on a collision course with
psychology, i.e., behavioral schools of economics.8 This Article builds
upon the rational-actor model but acknowledges the model's limitations
regarding behavioral economics. Hence, this Article draws from the
inter-related fields of uncertainty, philosophy, and cognitive psychology
to bridge the gap. The Article's interdisciplinary framework provides
nuance to the rational-actor model and ultimately opts for an
"optimization under constraints"-actor model.
THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 291 (2010); see also NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL
AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL-BUT SOME DON'T 29 (2012) ("Risk.
.. is something that you can put a price on... Uncertainty, on the other hand, is risk that
is hard to measure ... [Y]ou have no real idea how many [demons] there are or when
they might strike.").
As used in this Article, "cognitive psychology" also has a Keynesian historical
origin. "Cognitive psychology" deals with how economic actors make decisions-
ranging from hoarding to investing-despite the pervasiveness of uncertainty. Investors
and other business actors, far from being frozen into inaction by the unknown, make
decisions in the face of uncertainty, spurred less by rational Benthamite calculation of
"pleasure" and "pain" or benefit and cost, than by "animal spirits," which Keynes
characterized as "a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative
probabilities." KEYNES, INTEREST AND MONEY, supra, at 144-45. This does not mean
that economic actors or agents make decisions purely irrationally, but rather
pragmatically. There is a liminal space in between "pure reason" and irrationality or a-
rationality. Richard Posner, in his review of George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Schiller's
Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for
Global Capitalism, critiqued Akerlof and Schiller's interpretation of "animal spirits" as
meaning exclusively "noneconomic motives and irrational behaviors." Cf Richard A.
Posner, Shorting Reason, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.powells.com/review/2009 04_16.html. At a more contemporary and
supplementary level, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman's recently published work in
cognitive psychology demonstrates that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting
values to simpler judgmental operations." DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOw 419 (2011). For example, Kahneman notes that "[pleople tend to access the
relative importance of issues by the ease with which they are retrieved from memory-
and this is largely determined by the extent of coverage in the media." Id. at 8.
This Article both draws from and engages these multidisciplinary sources, but
further, specifically focuses on how, against the backdrop of HB 87, individuals make
decisions based on limited heuristic biases that are further reinforced by information
asymmetries and political rhetoric.
7. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra note 4, at 225.
8. Id.
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This Article concludes that the uncertain results of the mortgage
foreclosure crisis are best ameliorated not by the procedures of HB 87,
but by granting homeowners the time that the usual judicial processes
take, as well as preserving, as much as possible, the elasticity of the
common law tradition in American courts.
1. PERSPECTIVES ON HB 87 AND LIMITATIONS ON THEIR
APPLICABILITY
Touted as the antidote to Florida's foreclosure crisis, HB 87
received a fair bit of polemical coverage. MoveOn, a liberal nonprofit
political action committee, denounced HB 87 as "another brazen attempt
to further deprive U.S. citizens of their constitutional rights to due
process of law in Florida's courts."9  In contrast, the Community
Advocacy Network ("CAN"), a statewide not-for-profit advocacy
network that promotes favorable community association legislation,
enthusiastically advocated the new law.1° CAN's spokesperson and
founder, Donna DiMaggio Berger, rhetorically positioned HB 87 as
diluting the power of banks in delaying the foreclosure process, which is
damaging to community associations:
Far too many associations have been held in limbo waiting for banks
to foreclose on delinquent properties in their communities. HB 87
will give associations a new tool in the form of an Order to Show
Cause to force banks to proceed expeditiously with their foreclosure
actions unless they can produce a compelling reason they cannot do
11
so.
But foreclosure defense attorney, Mark Stopa, decried the bill as
giving already powerful banks even more leverage, to the detriment of
homeowners. He declared:
The biggest reason foreclosure cases go slowly in Florida is because
banks want them to go slowly. Sure, foreclosure cases often go
slower when lawyers like myself are involved. However, even with
the increasing number of lawyers defending foreclosures nowadays,
the vast majority of foreclosure cases in Florida remain
unopposed.... [A]dvocates of this proposed legislation complain
9. Kill House Bill 87, MOVEON, http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/kill-house-bill-87
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
10. Marianela Toledo, Florida's Foreclosure Act May End up in Legal Battle,
FLORIDA WATCHDOG (June 4, 2013), http://watchdog.org/88338/floridas-foreclosure-act-
may-end-up-in-legal-battle/.
11. Donna DiMaggio Berger, Speedier Bank Foreclosures on the Horizon Thanks to
HB 87!, SUN SENTINEL (May 6, 2013), http://blogs.sun-
sentinel.com/condoblog/2013/05/speedier-bank-foreclosures-on-the-horizon-thanks-to-
hb-87.html.
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about how long it takes to adjudicate a foreclosure case, yet most
cases are unopposed .... [T]here is absolutely no excuse for banks to
be unable to finish a foreclosure case in, say, less than a year when a
case is unopposed...12
Notwithstanding the rhetorical finger-pointing regarding who is to
blame in the current foreclosure crisis, there is consensus on at least one
point. Namely, that the principal group that will bear the brunt of HB
87's social costs is less affluent private homeowners already embattled in
a fight to save their homes. Thus, State Senator Darren Soto, D-Orlando,
who wanted Governor Rick Scott to veto the bill, declared: "[t]his
legislation would mark the biggest reduction of homeowner (and)
homestead rights in generations."'13  And although DiMaggio Berger
stressed that there are some Florida homeowners whose interests are
"protected" by the bill, such as those who are "paying members of
homeowners' associations,"14 and those who "have fallen victim to
foreclosure while paying for the budget shortfalls created by their
neighbors who preceded them on the foreclosure path,"'5 she did
acknowledge that "mortgage defense attorneys would likely not support
the bill since their clients benefit from longer foreclosure proceedings."
'' 6
Above and beyond the inflated rhetorical positioning, this Article
argues for a balanced, neo-pragmatic approach in assessing the probable
outcomes of the passage of HB 87. The theoretical core of this Article
reflects recent trends in law and economics that attempt to nuance the
emphasis on the "efficiency" implications of the Chicago School with an
analysis of the distributive consequences of the law.17 Therefore, the
Article reflects the law and economics movement's shift away from a
deterministic analysis to a more functional, adaptive, and pragmatic
approach, forged in part as a response to the postmodernist critique.'8
This Article follows the post-Chicago recognition that although "[i]t may
have appeared useful at one time to distinguish the efficiency of legal
12. Mark Stopa, The Problems with House Bill 87, STOPA LAW FIRM (Feb. 17,
2013), http://www.stayinmyhome.com/the-problems-with-house-bill-87/.




17. See Jules L. Coleman, Afterword: The Rational Choice Approach to Legal
Rules, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 179 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
(1992); Symposium, Post-Chicago Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (1989);
see also Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: A New Era of Law and Economics, 65 CM.-
KENT L. REV. 3 (1989) (summarizing the more pragmatic dimensions of a "post-Chicago"
law and economics movement).
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rules from their distributive dimension .... it was never analytically
possible, nor is it now normatively defensible to do so."' 
9
Proponents of HB 87 argue that "Florida's judicial-based
foreclosure process has been blamed for slowing and prolonging the
recovery of the state's housing markets.2° Proponents look to the more
speedy economic recovery of non-judicial states, where the foreclosure
process is on a much more abbreviated time horizon.21 However, this
premise draws from certain assumptions that have unintended
consequences. For example, statistical probabilities are unknown until
after the fact.22  Thus, one cannot easily parse out causation from
correlation. There is value in statistical inference, but its scope must be
limited; as Nasim Taleb quips, "[s]tatistical and applied probabilistic
knowledge is the core of knowledge ... but... let's not be suckers.23
On the other hand, we are not persuaded by populist rhetoric that
obviates any responsibility on the part of homeowners.24 Borrowers are
not free from culpability. They often make poor financial decisions
based on heuristic biases as opposed to deliberate and rational thought. 25
Banking systems are important as the primary allocator of capital
and play an instrumental role in speculation.26 Nonetheless, lending
institutions and mortgage servicers should not be allowed to capitalize on
the information asymmetries inherent in loan origination and servicing.
Borrower reliance on imperfect information is two-fold: first, borrowers
rely on imperfect information when taking out mortgages and, second,
they rely on incomplete information to explore foreclosure prevention
alternatives. Worse yet, the government has given borrowers ineffective
information by championing programs like the Home Affordable
Modification Program ("HAMP") 27 and consent orders like the National
19. Coleman, supra note 17, at 177.
20. Mary Shanklin, Group Asks Scott to Veto Speedier-Foreclosure Bill, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (May 29, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-05-29/business/os-
foreclosure-law-veto-20130529_1_florida-gov-foreclosures-florida-bill.
21. See generally H.R. 2013-h0087z.CJS, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0087z.C
JS.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0087&Session=2013.
22. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Fourth Quadrant: A Map of the Limits of Statistics,
in THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF DECISION-MAKING, PROBLEM-SOLVING, AND
PREDICTION 225, 232 (John Brockman ed., 2013) [hereinafter Brockman, THINKING]. In
addition, advocates may be subject to confirmation bias-the tendency to find samples
that confirm one's theory. See also id. at 240.
23. Id. at 226.
24. See, e.g., JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL 10 (2009) (noting that "mortgage
brokers.., steered hard-up working-class families toward risky subprime mortgages").
25. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 4, at 419.
26. See CASSIDY, supra note 24, at 331.
27. Under the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA"), the United States
Treasury instituted a number of programs, including the Making Home Affordable Act.
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Mortgage Settlement Agreement ("NMSA").2 8  Servicers are not
complying with either program,29 and there is no private right of action
for borrowers to sue for noncompliance.30
II. DESCRIPTION AND UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF HB 87
This section explains three features of HB 87: (1) the statute of
limitations for deficiency judgments, (2) the final judgment rule on
foreclosures, and (3) the shortened time frame homeowners have to
challenge foreclosure. A legal analysis of HB 87 demonstrates that it
greatly promotes utilitarian values over individual rights. Practically
speaking, HB 87 promotes the greater economic good to the detriment of
individual borrowers facing a foreclosure legal action. In addition, HB
87 endorses an expedited legal process. HB 87 fosters judicial economy
notwithstanding the significant detriment to the due process rights of
distressed borrowers. In a similar vein, HB 87 adopts formal rules that
greatly undercut the elasticity of foreclosure courts. Instrumentalist
judicial doctrines, like equity, will be ossified by HB 87's formal
language and rules. Hence, HB 87 promotes the formal language of rules
over the more flexible (instrumentalist) language of standards typical in
equity.
Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). HAMP
was part of the Making Home Affordable initiative. Id.
28. The NMSA is a part-federal, part-state government contract whose purpose is to
provide more modifications to a greater number of borrowers by obligating servicers to
comply with new servicing standards. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal
Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five
Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure
Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-
186.html.
29. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 2 Big Banks Face Suits in Mortgage Pact
Abuses, N.Y.TIMES (May 6, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/new-york-to-
sue-bank-of-america-and-wells-fargo-over-settlement-violations/. New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman stated that "Bank of America [has] flagrantly violated [the
consent judgment] obligations, putting hundreds of homeowners across New York at
greater risk of foreclosure." Id. Martha Coakley, Massachusetts Attorney General,
recently sent a letter to the settlement monitor "outlining 'recurring issues' with mortgage
servicers." Id.
30. See Arsen Sarapinian, Comment, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to
Enforce the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 909
n.27.
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A. Description and Legal Analysis of Key Provisions of HB 87
1. HB 87 Decreases the Statute of Limitations on Deficiency
Judgments.
HB 87 reduces the statute of limitations for deficiencies created by
mortgage foreclosure and deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. Specifically, HB
87 reduces the timetable from five years to one year for deficiencies
created by a foreclosure sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
31
Unfortunately, HB 87 fails to anticipate the effects of third party
debt collection. HB 87 is ineffectual in its goal to deter third party debt
collectors from attempting to collect debts and instead may facilitate
such debt collection through the one-year statute of limitations. Consider
the following hypothetical example.
Sam, the borrower, has a foreclosure judgment entered against him.
Sam's house sells for $100,000, but he was $170,000 in debt. Thus, the
mortgage servicer has the option of pursuing a deficiency judgment. The
servicer owns many such deficiency judgments that it may never pursue
because borrowers have little to no assets, especially considering the
truncated one-year statute of limitations. Nonetheless, the deficiency
judgments do have value, albeit cents on the dollar. Who would buy
deficiency judgments that will not be legally enforceable within one
year? Steve, working out of his basement in Coral Gables, will buy these
debts regardless of whether or not they are legally enforceable, and the
servicer will sell them. The servicer will expressly disclaim all
representations and guarantees with regard to the debt, including its
validity and legality. The servicer's disclaimer will not stop Steve from
purchasing Sam's debt. Steve is betting that Sam will not know about
HB 87's one-year statute of limitations for pursuing a deficiency
judgment. Thus, Steve has incentive to collect on Sam's debt even
though the debt is legally unenforceable.
Moreover, HB 87 does not seem to provide clear statutory damages
for a violation thereof. Ergo, servicers will likely be able to continue to
sell "expired debt," and Steve will continue to buy it. What if Sam the
borrower wants to sue over the unfair debt collection? Consumer
attorneys will want a clear statutory provision regarding damages and
attorney fees to determine the financial advantages of providing legal
representation. Certainly, there are other causes of action, such as Fair
31. H.R. 87 § 95.11(2)(b)(5), 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=-h0087er.
docx&DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber=0087&Session=2013.
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Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") violations,32 but statutory
damages for the debtor are capped at $1000. 33 Moreover, there is not an
abundant supply of attorneys willing or able to work without a retainer
and solely on the possibility of prevailing in court. Thus, the one-year
limitation may have little pragmatic effect as it merely renders the
deficiency judgment legally unenforceable without providing any
sufficient remedy for illegal collection efforts.
Why would legislators pass a provision in HB 87 that has no teeth
and will do little to curb the collection efforts of third party debt
collectors? Most likely the particular provision is merely political
rhetoric to take the sting out of some of the more anti-borrower
provisions of HB 87. However, there is a noteworthy loophole. HB 87
makes no mention of a change in restrictions on short sale transactions.
Thus, one may argue that the statute of limitations to collect on a
deficiency following the short sale of a house is still five years.
However, if the homeowner enables the bank to foreclose or negotiates a
deal to give the house back to the bank, the statute of limitations to sue
for deficiency is reduced to only one year34-a stark and significant
difference. These subtleties would escape typical consumers like our
hypothetical "Sam," who represents the majority of buyers negatively
impacted by the bill.
2. HB 87 Makes Foreclosure Judgments Difficult to Overturn.
One of the most polemical provisions of the bill concerns the entry
of a mortgage foreclosure final judgment. If a third party unaffiliated
with the lender purchases the repossessed property, notwithstanding the
validity of the actual foreclosure proceedings, the borrower's sole
remaining remedy is to sue the bank for money damages.35 Pointedly,
HB 87 bars the mortgagor from suing to reacquire the property.36
Simply put, a mortgagor is barred from getting her home back if final
judgment is entered and the property is sold to a bona fide third party
purchaser.37 The one caveat is the appeals period that affords 30 days for
the borrower to file a notice of appeal from the final judgment. 38
32. "A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of
which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a
debt." Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2012).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).
34. H.R. 87 § 95.11(2)(b)(5), 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013).
35. Id. §§ 702.036(l)(a)-(b).
36. Id. § 702.036(1)(a).
37. Id. § 702.036(4).
38. Id. § 702.036(l)(a)(3). "Jurisdiction of the court under this rule shall be
invoked by filing a notice, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the
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However, along those lines, HB 87 seems to conflict with Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, which provides a party with relief from
final judgment.39 The first three prongs of Rule 1.540 provide relief for
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud; motions
pursuant thereto are to be brought within one year following the
judgment.40 Other grounds for relief include that the judgment or decree
is void or that "it is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree
should have prospective application. '41  The latter two grounds are
required to be brought within a "reasonable time.",
42
One of the most powerful remedies for a borrower is a motion to
vacate final judgment. The underlying premise of the motion is
normative; namely the borrower's home is at stake and not affording a
litigant substantial justice43 or her day in court44 would seem inequitable.
Absent the borrower's ability to keep her home through relief from final
judgment, this underlying normative premise disappears.
Let's continue the thought experiment with Sam to illustrate some
of the unintended consequences described in the points above. After
losing his job due to the economic recession, Sam stretches his limited
savings until he eventually defaults on his mortgage. Sam contacts his
mortgage servicer who advises that Sam need only send some financial
documentation in order to be considered for a loan modification.
Whether through Sam's indolence or his servicer's shenanigans, he does
not receive a modification. Sam receives a summons and immediately
calls his servicer, who informs him that his options include a short sale or
"cash for keys." Over the next two weeks, Sam must determine his
deficiency (specifically whether the deficiency will be waived and
whether he has to pay taxes thereon), the relative damage to his credit
score, and the cost of a foreclosure attorney, and begin the process of
contacting a realtor who specializes in short sales. Shortly thereafter, a
default is entered against Sam, and the mortgage servicer is granted final
judgment.
Sam will have to bring a motion to vacate the judgment against him,
which typically requires showing excusable neglect, meritorious defense,
clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed." FLA.
R. App. P. 9.110(b).




43. For example, vacating a final judgment (typically summary judgment) when
there is excusable neglect and a meritorious defense. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(1).
44. This is in the event a default judgment has been entered.
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and due diligence.45  Grounds for excusable neglect are generally
liberal.46 Courts only consider the due diligence exercised in remedying
the default judgment and not the defaulted party's conduct prior
47thereto. A meritorious defense, while required to be set forth in a
verified answer, sworn motion, or affidavit, is typically not a difficult
burden of proof.48 A meritorious defense can range from the
insufficiency of the foreclosing party's affidavit to a dispute regarding
the amounts due and owing. Notwithstanding the required elements, the
normative implications of a homeowner losing his home as a result of
servicer malfeasance may often be the tipping point for judges.
Rule 1.540(b)(4) also provides for relief, if brought within a
reasonable time, for a judgment or decree that is void. However, Rule
1.540(b)(4) appears already to have limited context in the area of
borrower relief from foreclosure judgments.49 The Fourth District Court
of Appeals held that even when a plaintiff lacked standing to pursue
foreclosure, the judgment was merely voidable, not void.50 Accordingly,
the judgment could not be set aside under 1.540(b)(4) because the
defaulted borrower failed to raise standing as an affirmative defense.51
In contrast, other jurisdictions hold standing to be a jurisdictional
prerequisite or a matter of sound judicial policy.5 2 Lack of standing is
45. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540; see Net One, LLC v. Christian Telecom Network,
LLC, 901 So. 2d 417,419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
46. Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
("[W]here inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding,
a system gone awry or any other of the foibles to which human nature is heir, then upon
timely application accompanied by a reasonable and credible explanation the matter
should be permitted to be heard on the merits.").
47. Zeigler v. Huston, 626 So. 2d 1046, 1047 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
[T]he diligence which must be shown by a movant in connection with a motion
to vacate, is the due diligence demonstrated in seeking relief after learning that
a default has been entered, not in keeping abreast of the litigation prior to entry
of a default as the trial court concluded.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Cinkat Transp., Inc., v. Maryland Casualty Co., 596
So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that an attorney's prompt contact to
opposing counsel upon learning of default was found to be diligent despite the fact that
the attorney did not file a motion to vacate for over two months after entry of default).
48. See, e.g., Am. Network Transp. Mgmt. v. A Super-Limo Co., 857 So. 2d 313,
315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the defendant demonstrated the existence of a
legal defense sufficient to vacate a judgment by alleging that the plaintiff failed to state a
cause of action and that both the statute of limitations and laches applied).
49. See, e.g., Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 83 So. 3d 893, 894-95
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
50. Id. at 895.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. M & I Peoples Bank, 290 N.W.2d 321,
325 n.5 (Wis. 1980) (string citation omitted) ("While no case can be found holding
standing to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, the doctrine has generally been applied as a
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commensurate with the court's competency to hear the case and is
inextricably linked to subject matter jurisdiction.53 Ergo, standing can be
brought at any time and sua sponte by the court.
5 4
While Florida courts have not held a judgment to be void if a
plaintiff lacked standing at the commencement of action, failure to
provide proper service is sufficient grounds for relief under
1.540(b)(4).5 Specifically, courts have held the failure of service of
process renders a decision void ab initio; hence, relief from judgment can
be granted at any time 6  To recap, 1.540(b)(4) provides relief when
there is no service of process and thus no personal jurisdiction over the
movant. However, Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. AMs. 57 indicates
that a plaintiffs standing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, and any
matter of 'sound judicial policy."'); Crippin Printing Corp. v. Abel, 441 N.E.2d 1002,
1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (internal citations omitted).
Standing is jurisdictional. 'Without the jurisdictional element of a case or
controversy any court is without power to render a decision. Therefore, it is the
law that a court must first determine that a party with standing has brought the
cause and that he brings a justiciable issue before the court. If such is not the
situation, there is nothing before the court and the court is totally without
jurisdiction to decide any issue in the cause.'
Id. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Nazareth, 818 A.2d 69, 70-71 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (noting that a party must have standing to assert a claim
in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim).
Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or
equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy .... [Our
Supreme Court] has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction,
because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of
the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time .... Where a party is found
to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the cause.
Id.; Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1053-54 (N.Y.
2003) ("Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a
threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked.");
Deutsche Bank v. Brumbaugh, 270 P.3d 151, 154 (Okla. 2012) ("Standing, as a
jurisdictional question, may be correctly raised at any level of the judicial process or by
the Court on its own motion.") (internal quotation omitted).
53. Saratoga Cnty. Chamber, 798 N.E.2d at 1053-54.
54. Brumbaugh, 270 P.3d at 154.
55. Dor Cha, Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 876 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that the trial court erred in denying motion to set aside default brought under
1.540(b)(4), which was based on inadequate service of process).
56. Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Prinzee v. Thurmond, 721 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (noting that "this legal principle is grounded in the notion that the passage
of time cannot make valid that which has always been void") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
57. See Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 83 So. 3d 893, 894-95 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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order entered in regard thereto is merely voidable, thereby precluding
relief under 1.504(b)(4).
Now, assume Sam never receives service of process with regard to
the foreclosure action instituted against him. Sam does not file a
responsive pleading because he does not know that he faces foreclosure.
Nonetheless, and unbeknownst to Sam, the foreclosing party is awarded
final judgment. Thirty-one days after the final judgment, Sam discovers
that his home was sold to a third party purchaser. Pursuant to Florida
statute § 702.036, because all applicable appeals periods have run, Sam
is only entitled to monetary damages.5 8 The house now belongs to the
third party purchaser. Despite the final judgment being void ab initio
and subject to relief pursuant to Rule 1.540(b), Sam is unable to recover
his home. In sum, HB 87 seems to preempt or otherwise obviate a
borrower's rights under Rule 1.540.
3. HB 87 Allows Secondary Lien Holders to Expedite
Foreclosure Action.
The "show cause" procedure in the law appears to have been the
most rhetorically explosive feature of the bill.59 Generally described, the
show cause procedure shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff-bank,
who must show why it is entitled to foreclose, to the defendant-
homeowner, who must prove why the bank is not entitled to the
foreclosure. This is a disturbing development to opponents of the bill.
Roy Oppenheim scathingly commented:
Florida State Rep. Kathleen Passidomo, who introduced the bill,
would argue that it protects consumers by ensuring that banks and
lenders prove they own a mortgage before they can file a foreclosure
action. What she doesn't say is that the banks will be permitted to
provide these certifications and the court will have to accept them on
face as being truthful. The onus falls on the homeowner to prove that
the banks are not telling the truth.
And to add insult to injury, they are only given 20 days to challenge
the bank, hardly enough time to find a lawyer and track down other
documentation to prove a wrongful foreclosure.60
58. See FLA. STAT. § 702.036 (2013).
59. See H.R. 87 § 702.10, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=-h0087er.
docx&DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber=0087&Session=2013.
60. Roy Oppenheim, Florida's 'Fair Foreclosure Act' is Anything But Fair, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/home-
front/2013/02/20/floridas-fair-foreclosure-act-is-anything-but-fair (emphasis added).
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If the defendant fails to raise any defenses, then judgment is entered
and a foreclosure sale date is scheduled.6' Even if the defendant presents
defenses at the show cause hearing, the judge can enter judgment
regardless if the judge finds that the defenses have no merit.62 Critics of
the bill raise an additional cautionary note: "[t]he allowance of the
retired senior judges to continue to serve in their capacity also is a
constitutional question, it allows such judges to basically continue to
serve while not facing either re-election or re-appointment as required by
the Florida constitution.
', 63
In brief, HB 87 provides lienholders the option to mobilize the show
cause procedure in the bank's foreclosure action, thus accelerating the
foreclosure process.64  Lienholders include the plaintiff and any
defendant who holds a lien encumbering the property or who may file a
lien against the real property of a condominium association or
homeowners' association.
65
When Sam is issued a foreclosure summons, he is on an expedited
time horizon to determine his legal position, which requires consulting a
legal professional. Ideally, Sam could consult a local legal aid
organization and receive some legal guidance without having to pay a
retainer fee. Unfortunately, legal aid organizations often have limited
resources and are understaffed. At best, the local legal aid organization
will advise that he may have a cause of action and should consult an
experienced foreclosure attorney. Now, Sam must determine if he
should spend his limited resources defending against a foreclosure action
for which he may have a complete, or at least partial, defense.
Continuing with the hypothetical, Sam noticed forced-place hazard
insurance payments that were over five times his previous payments.
These specious fees may have obviated his ability to secure a
modification or otherwise reinstate the loan. His mortgage servicer also
failed to proactively solicit him for a modification. Similarly, Sam was
the one always calling the servicer, waiting on hold, and getting different
representatives asking for documentation which he had already sent. The
scenario is oddly reminiscent of one of Kafka's nightmarish narratives.
Does Sam have a private right of action under any of the
aforementioned scenarios? Do the new laws instituted by the Consumer
61. FLA. STAT. § 702.10(1)(b), (d) (2013).
62. Id.
63. Brian Bandell, Governor Scott Signs Foreclosure Fast Track Bill, SOUTH
FLORIDA BUSINESS JOURNAL (June 10, 2013),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/news/2013/06/10/governor-scott-signs-
foreclosure-fast.html (quoting Roy Oppenheim).
64. FLA. STAT. § 702.10(1) (2013).
65. Id.
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Financial Protection Bureau66 allow for a private right of action? Sam
has no way of answering these complicated questions. Similarly, it is
difficult for Sam to evaluate whether he should invest his limited
resources in exploring a legal defense, let alone pursuing one. HB 87
now allows second mortgage holders, as well as condominium and
homeowners' associations, the right to expedite the bank's foreclosure
action. As a consequence, Sam now faces a myriad of likely well
represented stakeholders, with little time to make a rational decision.
Thus, time would seem a logical and fair requisite to ensure due process
and substantive justice.
B. Invalidity of the House of Representatives Final Bill Analysis of HB
87
The House of Representatives Final Bill Analysis (the "Report") is
largely supported by non-credible data from RealtyTrac.67 After a bill is
filed, it is reviewed by several committees which discuss amendments or
other changes.68 The Final Bill Analysis appears to be one of the final
reviews before the bill is put before the senate or the governor.69
RealtyTrac, according to its website, is "the leading provider of
comprehensive housing data nd analytics for the real estate and
financial services industries, Federal, State and local governments,
academic institutions, and the media.",
70
The Report begins with a finding that "[t]he foreclosure crisis has
greatly impacted the economy of the state of Florida.' Curiously, no
data supports this statement in the Report. The "Background" section,
which sets forth the Report's factual premises, then cites RealtyTrac data
five times and cites an article based thereon. The only non-RealtyTrac
related source cited in the first four paragraphs of the background section
is the Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator, which documents
66. New servicing guidelines went into effect on January 10, 2014, that, inter alia,
require servicers to solicit distressed borrowers for foreclosure provision alternatives,
provide continuity of contact, and prohibit dual tracking. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.40-41
(2014).
67. See H.R. 2013-h0087z.CJS, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0087z.C
JS.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0087&Session=2013.
68. How a Bill Becomes a Florida Law, FLORIDA FAMILY COUNCIL,
http://flfamily.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/0 1/How-Bill-Become-A-Law-2004-
06.pdf(presenting the legislative process in a convenient flow chart) (last visited Sept. 2,
2014).
69. See id.
70. About RealtyTrac, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/company-info (last
visited June 4, 2014). .
71. H.R. 2013-h0087z.CJS, at 2.
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and explains the disparity between the backlog of civil and criminal
dockets.72
Further, citing to RealtyTrac, the Report states that Florida has the
largest share of foreclosure inventory of any state in the nation.73
Moreover, it notes that the average length of time to file for foreclosure
in Florida is 853 days, whereas the national average is 414 days.74
RealtyTrac aggregated this data using an "abstractor," who collects
property information at local courthouses.75 RealtyTrac states that "[w]e
know the people, processes and forms so your data is accurate."76
However, RealtyTrac may have not have Florida consumers' best
interests at heart. RealtyTrac describes itself as "as the foremost source
of foreclosure data, and continues to offer the only major real estate
website featuring foreclosure, auction, bank-owned, for-sale-by-owner,
and resale properties."7 7 RealtyTrac's primary revenue stream appears to
come from monthly subscriptions to its foreclosure listings. Benefits of a
subscription include access to 1.2 million foreclosures nationwide,
saving up to 50 percent when purchasing a foreclosed home, robust
property information, and online training on how to buy a foreclosed
home. One may infer from the subscription package that RealtyTrac has
an incentive to boost foreclosures statistics whenever possible. If
foreclosures are on the decline, RealtyTrac subscriptions will wane and
revenue streams will drop.
Colorado state official Ryan McMaken has criticized RealtyTrac for
its inaccurate reporting of foreclosure data in Colorado.78 McMaken
compared Colorado's numbers of the second quarter in 2009 with the
figures reported by RealtyTrac. While Colorado showed a 16 percent
drop in the foreclosures, RealtyTrac showed a 4.7 percent increase over
the same period.79 McMaken stated that RealtyTrac's methodology is
72. See id.
73. H.R. 2013-h0087z.CJS, at 2.
74. Id.
75. RealtyTrac, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.corn/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2014).
76. Id.
77. About ReallyTrac, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/company-info (last
visited July 27, 2014).
78. See RealtyTrac's Foreclosure Data Wrong, State Official Says, INSIDE REAL
ESTATE NEWS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://insiderealestatenews.com/2010/08/13/realtytracs-
foreclose-data-wrong-state-officials-says/ [hereinafter McMaken Report] (containing a
copy of McMaken's report criticizing RealtyTrac's calculation methods).
79. McMaken even tried a similar methodology to RealtyTrac but still found the
combined total to be down 5.9%. Id.
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flawed; namely, its collection methods are obscure,80 and it double-
sometimes triple-counts foreclosures.
81
Andrew Galvin, a journalist for the Orange County Register, noted
that one reason for the inaccurate figures is that RealtyTrac counts every
step in the foreclosure process, which explains the discrepancies.82 For
example, if a home goes into default, is scheduled for auction, and is then
repossessed, RealtyTrac counts the home three times.83 Galvin reported
on McMaken's efforts to collect accurate foreclosure information, during
which McMaken obtained data from all 64 Colorado counties.84 While
RealtyTrac reported 54,747 "foreclosure actions," McMaken's data
revealed that only 28,435 homes entered into the foreclosure process.
85
McMaken concluded that RealtyTrac data "wasn't useful because it
didn't reflect how many homeowners were actually in danger of losing
their homes."86 He stated that "[w]e couldn't really use those numbers
for having serious discussions."87 Yet the Florida Legislature has done
just that by using RealtyTrac data as the material basis for HB 87.
The best treatment of the lack of credible data regarding
foreclosures is found in Levitin and Goodman's work. Authors Adam J.
Levitin and Joshua S. Goodman acknowledged that "there is no
authoritative source on foreclosure statistics."88  Their research paper
80. Id. ("The details of RealtyTrac's data collection remain a mystery."); accord
Lance George & Keith Wiley, Foreclosure in Rural America: An Update, Hous.
ASSISTANCE COUNCIL, Mar. 2011, at 18, available at
http://hac.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/rcbiforeclosurebrief pdf
("RealtyTrac does not openly disclose its methodology for data collection. ... ); Toby
Tobin, Media Citing RealtyTrac Foreclosure Stats are Misleading Their Audiences,
GOTOBY.COM (June 18, 2013), http://gotoby.com/news/article/2096/Media-Citing-
RealtyTrac-Foreclosure-Stats-are-Misleading-Their-Audiences ("[RealtyTrac's] data
sources apparently do not include the Clerk of Courts. . . . [Which] is where all
foreclosure activity is officially documented").
81. McMaken Report, supra note 78. For a more detailed exegesis noting several
empirical flaws in the collection effort, see id.




83. Id. (noting that Colorado state officials and the Atlanta Journal Constitution
both revealed statistical inaccuracies for Colorado and Georgia respectively).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (relaying McMaken's statements).
87. Galvin, supra note 82 (quoting statement made by McMaken on behalf of the
Colorado Division of Housing).
88. Adam J. Levitin & Joshua S. Goodman, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis:
Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy 1 n. I (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1071931, 2008). Compare id.,
with Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
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explains that neither the federal government nor states have instituted
meaningful measures of foreclosures.89  Though citing RealtyTrac
figures, the authors admitted that the reliability of these figures is open to
question.9° Specifically, foreclosure start statistics are typically much
higher than completed foreclosures because multiple filings are counted
in duplicate.91 Moreover, a modification or other foreclosure prevention
alternatives may obviate many foreclosure proceedings.
92
Lastly, a reporter for the Phoenix Business Journal, Kristena
Hansen, uncovered another flaw in RealtyTrac's foreclosure statistics-
the foreclosure rate calculations.93  According to Daren Blomquist,
RealtyTrac's vice president and spokesman, the rate is calculated by
"tak[ing] the total number of properties with foreclosure filings and then
divid[ing] that by the total number of housing units in the metro area or
state area."9 4 Hansen pointed out that the total number of housing units
is derived from 2010 U.S. Census Bureau information.95 Further,
Hansen noted that RealtyTrac data assumes that every standing house has
a mortgage. 
96
However, of course, not every standing house has a mortgage. For
example, considering the number of distressed homes that cash investors
have picked up, the rate may be significantly inaccurate.97 Blomquist
admitted that "ideally it would be better to use the total mortgages" and
"if we had that mortgage data when we started this report, we probably
would've use[d] [it]. ' '98 This begs the question of why RealtyTrac would
even use this data, given its problematic assumption.99 Blomquist stated
Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 565 (omitting the acknowledgement that there is
uncertainty regarding foreclosure statistics).




93. Kristena Hansen, The Real Story Behind RealtyTrac's Foreclosure Data,
PHOENIX Bus. J. (July 27, 2012),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/phoenix/blogIbusiness/2012/07/the-real-story-behind-
realtytracs.html?page=all.




98. Hansen, supra note 93.
99. Blomquist advised that RealtyTrac has since subscribed to the data regarding
mortgaged homes as opposed to merely standing homes data from the U.S. Census
Report, but had not incorporated that data into its calculations. See id. Accordingly, it is
unclear as to the methodology used to determine the foreclosure rates employed by
RealtyTrac upon which the House of Representatives' Bill Analysis based.
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that consistency and avoiding confusion were the main reasons behind
the continued use of flawed data. 100
But the real economic reason appears to be two-fold: (1) it would
cost too much money to change; and (2) it would deflate the high
foreclosure rates upon which their subscriptions primarily depend. The
question is not why RealtyTrac would skew these figures. Using a
rational actor model, that's easy-money! The more pressing question is:
why would the Florida Legislature rely on these figures to pass
legislation, assuming it is aware of the problematic assumptions from
which the data springs? It is simply not logical.
"Logic is the lifeblood of American law" and is based largely on
deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning.01 Deductive reasoning
is used to derive a conclusion from two other propositions. 102 Syllogistic
reasoning is the primary form of deductive reasoning used in law and
consists of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. Cicero
is attributed with saying "there is in fact a true law-namely right
reason."103 Without delving into ontology, we can still derive pragmatic
value from reason as applied in contemporary law. Reason is essential to
keep legal professionals, including legislators, from making "untethered,
unprincipled, and undisciplined" hunches. 
104
Consider the classic example of a syllogism:
1. Major Premise: All men are mortal.
2. Minor Premise: Socrates is a man.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
A quickly drawn-up (and imperfect) syllogism applied to HB 87
would look something like this:
1. Expediting the foreclosure process is necessary to alleviate
the economic repercussions of the foreclosure crisis.
2. The provisions of HB 87 expedite the foreclosure process.
3. Therefore, HB 87 will alleviate the economic repercussions
of the foreclosure crisis.
Unfortunately, the major premise is not a generally accepted rule
like "all men are mortal." Instead, HB 87's major premise must be
induced from fresh empirical evidence. Inductive reasoning involves
100. Id.
101. Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Logic For Law Students: How To Think Like A
Lawyer, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2007).
102. Id. at 2.
103. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH 215 (George Holland
Sabine & Stanley Barney Smith trans., The Ohio State Univ. Press 1929).
104. Aldisert, supra note 101, at 3 (citing JOHN DEWEY, How WE THINK: A
RESTATEMENT OF THE RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS 17
(1933)).
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deriving general principles from many small events. 10 5 While deductive
reasoning is able to arrive at a logically inescapable conclusion,
inductive reasoning is not so absolute.10 6 The Report plainly shows that
HB 87 is based on non-credible data from RealtyTrac. 107 In other words,
the "many small events"--or better yet the "one small event"--of
RealtyTrac data from which to induce HB 87's major premise are not
credible. Ergo, the induction of the major premise is invalid and, so too,
are any conclusions deduced therefrom.
Thus, two inferences can probably be made: (1) the legislature did
not exercise due diligence to uncover sufficient empirical evidence for
HB 87, or (2) ulterior but not necessarily corrupt motives were at play. If
the former is true, then any ameliorative effects of HB 87 will be merely
coincidental, and this is no way for government to make consistently
sound decisions. If the latter is true, the subterfuge employed by the
legislature stands in stark contrast to their role as representatives of the
people's will. Either way, the long-term unintended effects, principally
on financially distressed private homeowners struggling to keep their
homes, may include a disenfranchisement from civil participation and an
alienation from the legal process.
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HB 87
This Part employs areas outside of law, such as economics, to
demonstrate that HB 87 will unintentionally undercut the policies it seeks
ultimately to promote. In this Part, we attempt to perform rationally
based thought experiments regarding the probable pragmatic effects of
HB 87 through the lens of growing disciplines like cognitive psychology
and uncertainty theory. These experiments reveal that HB 87 will likely
result in unintended consequences that may chill the economy and
disenfranchise Floridians from the legal process. This Article maintains
that HB 87 is an unwise risk in an uncertain economic future and
suggests that the time afforded in litigation and the decision making of
elastic courts are the best means to promote certainty.
A. Assumptions and Unintended Consequences of HB 87
The fundamental issue with HB 87 is its failure to recognize the
inherent lack of certainty and predictability in the current foreclosure
process. In particular, HB 87 advocates a quick cleanup of the
foreclosure crisis as opposed to remedying any of the underlying
105. See id. at 12.
106. See id. at 13.
107. See discussion supra notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
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information asymmetries. Servicer guidelines and the surrounding
political rhetoric have muddied the borrower's information pool. As a
result, borrowers are unable to make efficient decisions to maximize
their own welfare.10 8  Individuals can make rational decisions by
operating under known constraints. More so, individuals are able to
cognize uncertainty and, accordingly, can tailor their decision-making
process. However, HB 87 does little to remedy any of these information
asymmetries and instead only adds further confusion.
HB 87 largely ignores the individual crises faced by distressed
homeowners in favor of utilitarian values. HB 87 demonstrates an acute
theoretical naivet6 with regard to the difficulties encountered by
distressed borrowers. Namely, it fails to consider the time horizon in
which unsophisticated borrowers have to make life-changing financial
and legal decisions. Conversely, if the modus operandi is "borrowers,
you made your bed, now lie in it"-then merely say so. Of course,
elected officials would be wary of the corresponding political backlash of
any such statement. However, borrowers would be better able to gauge
the probability of affordable modifications and pursue other loss
mitigation avenues. Needless to say, this has not been the case. As a
result, individuals may be disenfranchised from a legal system,
especially a court of equity, which is otherwise meant to provide relief.
In sum, HB 87's failure to consider the rights of distressed homeowners
may result in short-term economic gains, but the bill's ultimate effect is
likely to compromise sustained economic growth. Long-term
consequences range from a chill in the housing economy to mass
disenfranchisement from legal process.
The following issues have blurred the social costs and lead to
unintended consequences: assumptions regarding borrower decision
making, the inherent complexity of debt fracturing, political rhetoric, and
equivocating risk and uncertainty. Lastly, HB 87 effectively eliminates a
borrower's last procedural safeguard: time.
1. Inherent Complexity of Debt Fracturing and Assumptions
Regarding Borrower Decision Making
The foreclosure process is ripe with information asymmetries that
would leave a sophisticated actor bewildered, let alone an emotionally
distressed borrower. Mortgage servicers often have competing
108. It is important to note that we employ "rationale" in its more progressive sense,
i.e., "in an uncertain world there is no optimal solution known for most interesting and
urgent problems." Brockman, THINKING, supra note 22, at 40 (2013) (quoting Gerd
Gigerenzer). Instead we make decisions based on bounded rationality otherwise referred
to as "optimization under constraints." Id. at 47-48.
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incentives which are in direct opposition to the investors' interests.
Diane Thompson aptly breaks down the competing incentives involved
in debt fracturing. She notes that the servicer's main function is to
collect and process payments on mortgage loans from homeowners, and,
typically, they do not have any ownership interest in the mortgage
loan.10 9 Servicers, unlike investors, recover all of their hard costs after a
foreclosure, even if the home sells for less than the mortgage loan
balance.110 Servicers may even profit from foreclosures by charging
borrowers and investors fees that are ultimately recouped from a
mortgage backed security. " Debt fracturing and its repercussions are
extremely complicated, and borrowers lack the sophistication to establish
their financial and legal positions without expert advice. Assuming
borrowers have the financial means, they must decide whether to hire
counsel to oppose the foreclosure or to allocate those resources to
relocating.
Typically borrowers, without expert advice, are unable to make
sound legal or financial decisions. The informational barriers inherent in
the foreclosure process often "prevent borrowers from identifying errors
that would justify halting the foreclosure process." 112 Worse yet, the
expectation is that investors and servicers are acting with rational
economic behavior, which is not necessarily the case. 113 In other words,
investors and services might make decisions in which they lose money.
In judicial foreclosure states like Florida, time was the one ally that
borrowers had before HB 87 became law.114 Conversely, HB 87 gives
second mortgage holders and condominium and homeowners
associations the right to expedite the bank's foreclosure action.
Moreover, the bill makes foreclosure judgments extremely difficult to
overturn. Hence, HB 87 constrains a borrower's ability to rationally
109. See DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., WHY SERVICERS
FORECLOSE WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR, at




112. Andrew J. Kazakes, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation:
The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1400 (2010).
113. See Gretchen Morgenson, So Many Foreclosures, So Little Logic, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2009, at BU1 (quoting Professor Alan M. White's conclusion that in many cases
the decision to foreclose "is not rational economic behavior" based on his study of almost
32,000 liquidation sales conducted in June 2009, for which the average loss was 64.7% of
the original loan balance).
114. See, e.g., Rebekah Cook-Mack & Sarah Parady, Home Affordable Modification
Program Enforcement Through the Courts, 40 HOUSING L. BULL. 136, 140 (2010),
available at https://nhlp.org/files/NHLPBullJun10_052710.pdf ("As program
documentation develops. . ., possibilities for affirmative litigation expand.").
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evaluate the borrower's legal and financial positions both ex-ante and ex-
post with respect to foreclosure. Time is essential for a borrower to
overcome the informational barriers inherent in the foreclosure process
and, based on that information, make rational decisions regarding their
future. Time is also essential to properly evaluate the premises and
assumptions of proposed legislation in order to properly forecast its long-
term effects. Hence, time is the best insurance against risk in an
uncertain future. Time also allows regulators, like state attorneys
general, the opportunity to fully investigate the mortgage servicing
industry and bring suit when appropriate. All of these considerations
lend to the importance of the elasticity of foreclosure courts in basing
decisions on equity and interpretive case law.
2. Political Rhetoric: Mixing the Signal and the Noise
Nate Silver, statistician and writer, in his work The Signal and the
Noise, describes the difficulty in attaining a clear signal amidst a
superfluity of information.115  The distressed borrower is a prime
example of a signal-seeker amidst the informational chaos of HAMP,
116
the NMSA,' 17 the OCC Amended Consent Judgments,118 and so forth.
The information sought is the borrower's legal rights during a
foreclosure. HB 87 does little to alleviate this confusion with its hand-
waving provisions to borrowers.
Another hand-waving statute, the California Foreclosure Prevention
Acts ("CFPA"), has been passed in California to protect homeowners
115. See generally SILVER, supra note 6.
116. See discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text.
117. See discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text.
118. A press release explains the OCC Amended Consent Judgments:
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve
Board today released amendments to their enforcement actions against 13
mortgage servicers for deficient practices in mortgage loan servicing and
foreclosure processing. The amendments require the servicers to provide $9.3
billion in payments and other assistance to borrowers.
The amendments memorialize agreements in principle announced in January
with Aurora, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan
Chase, MetLife Bank, Morgan Stanley, PNC, Sovereign, SunTrust, U.S. Bank,
and Wells Fargo. The amount includes $3.6 billion in cash payments and $5.7
billion in other assistance to borrowers such as loan modifications and
forgiveness of deficiency judgments.
Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Amendments to Consent Orders Memorialize $9.3 Billion
Foreclosure Agreement (Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-ia-2013-35.html.
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from unnecessary foreclosures.119 California homeowners are already at
a disadvantage because California is a non-judicial foreclosure state.
The lender is merely required to "send a notice of sale to the homeowner,
place an advertisement in a local paper, and hire an auctioneer to sell the
property."'' 20 Thus, the borrower must file an affirmative court action to
stop a foreclosure sale in a non-judicial state. 121
The California Governor and Legislature designed legislation that
attempted to promote the creation of loan modification programs and
support sustainable foreclosure prevention alternatives.22 In contrast,
Assembly member Todd Lieu, co-author of the original 2009 bill, stated
"there is no guarantee in the law or anywhere else that anybody is going
to get a loan modification."'123 A recent decision out of the First District
of California seems to reflect as much when it held that the statute
"merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan modifications on
certain terms" and "conspicuously does not require lenders to take any
action."'124  On the other hand, the Fourth District reads the relevant
statutes as "establish[ing] a natural, logical whole, and one wholly
consonant with the Legislature's intent in enacting 2923.5 to have
individual borrowers and lenders 'assess' and 'explore' alternatives to
119. California Foreclosure Prevention Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2923.52-.55 (West
2011) (repealed 2011); see ROGER BERNHARDT ET AL., CALIFORNIA MORTGAGES, DEEDS
OF TRUST, AND FORECLOSURE LITIGATION § 2.62C (Bonnie C. Maly 4th ed. 2014).
120. Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in
Nonjudiical Foreclosure States, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 343 (2011-2012) (citing
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 61.24.030(8), 61.24.031(l)(a), 61.24.040(3)(2011)).
121. Id. at 394.
122. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Works
with Lenders to Help Homeowners Avoid Foreclosure (Nov. 20, 2007) (on file with the





also 2008 Cal. Stat. 225 (adding a 30 day delay to the foreclosure process and requiring
lenders to assist borrowers in default to avoid foreclosure).
123. See Carolyn Said, Foreclosure Freeze Prods Banks to Modify Loans, SFGATE
(June 16, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Foreclosure-freeze-
prods-banks-to-modify-loans-3228860.php (quoting Mark Leyes, Department of
Corporations spokesperson).
124. Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 214 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1056 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2013) ("Civil Code section 2923.6 does not grant a right to a loan
modification."); see also Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC, 195 Cal. App.
4th 1602, 1617 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011) ("There is no duty under Civil Code section
2923.6 to agree to a loan modification. [§ 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that lenders
will offer loan modifications on certain terms; the statute conspicuously does not require
lenders to take any action].") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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foreclosure."125 Otherwise, the legislature would have conferred a right
on individual borrowers without any means of enforcing it. 1
26
The Homeowner's Bill of Rights ("HBR") took effect on January 1,
2013.127 The HBR includes, among other things, a restriction on dual
track foreclosure, guaranteed single point of contact, enforceability, and
verification of documents.128 It is no wonder that California Attorney
General, Kamala Harris, was listed as one of Time's 2013 100 Most
Influential People in the World for "[taking] on the big banks to secure a
bill of rights for California homeowners and up to $20 billion to help
struggling families."'129  Notwithstanding the paucity of case law in
regards thereto, the HBR may have a limited scope of application. For
example, there is no indication that the law is to be applied
retroactively. 130 Other courts have deftly avoided the issue of retroactive
application of the HBR. 3' At best, the HBR is a means to postpone
foreclosure sales prior to the occurrence, and it is not grounds for relief
post-foreclosure. It remains undecided whether the HBR has retroactive
application, but the outlook is not favorable.
To summarize, some California politicians seem largely detached
from the realities of the pragmatic consequences of their proposed
legislation. Instead, they focus on garnering political capital. The
political rhetoric and the real world disconnect is analogous to the
National Mortgage Settlement Agreement ("NMSA") and Florida
Attorney General Pam Bondi's handling thereof as described below.
125. Skov v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 207 Cal. App. 4th 690, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
(citing Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 223-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)).
126. Id.
127. California Homeowner Bill of Rights, ST. CAL. DEP'T JUST., OFF. ATT'Y GEN.,
http://oag.ca.gov/hbor (last visited June 9, 2014).
128. Id.
129. The 2013 Time 100, TIME, http://timel00.time.com/2013/04/18/time-
100/slide/kamala-harris/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
130. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. CV F 13-1620 LJO JLT,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10449, at *28 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (finding that the
complaint's HBR claims are not subject to retroactive operation and are thus barred.);
Didak v. Merrill Lynch Mortg. Investors, No. B240704, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
4102, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2013); see also, Long v. Onewest Bank, No.
G046402, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3158, at *5 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2013)
("Because the California Homeowner Bill of Rights became effective on January 1, 2013,
after Defendants foreclosed on the Longs' property, we do not address its application to
this case.") (internal citations omitted).
131. Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 86 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013) ("We do not address either argument because Lueras alleged that Bank of
America engaged in conduct that amounted to fraudulent practices, independent of the
California Homeowner Bill of Rights.").
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In April 2012, five of the largest mortgage services entered into the
NMSA with 49 state attorneys general.132 However, servicers are now
refusing to honor the terms of the agreement notwithstanding copious
political rhetoric. 
133
On March 12, 2012, the Florida Attorney General's Office released
a press release stating that Pam Bondi filed a complaint "requiring the
nation's five largest mortgage servicers to comply with comprehensive
new mortgage loan servicing standards, to provide substantial direct
consumer relief and monetary payments, and to submit to an independent
monitor."1 34 Pam Bondi stated:
Today's filings pave the way for court orders that will provide
substantial relief to Florida's homeowners, hold banks accountable and
reform the mortgage servicing industry ... We are one of the states on
the monitoring committee, and we will ensure that banks comply with
this agreement and that they are held accountable. 135 Further press
releases stated Florida's share of the total monetary benefits is
approximately $8.4 billion. 
136
Nonetheless, the major servicers continue to flout the NMSA with
impunity in Florida and around the nation.' 37 Unfortunately, the
settlement does not include a private right of action that would allow
borrowers and their advocates to pursue claims for noncompliance.3 8
Servicers have routinely failed to meet the following obligations:
provide a single point of contact ("SPOC"), provide appropriate written
reason for denials, input correct data in NPV tests,139 and, otherwise,
engage in sustainable and meaningful modifications.
132. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 28. Various state mortgage regulatory
agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury also took part in the settlement. Id.
133. See, e.g., Silver-Greenberg, supra note 29.
134. Attorney General Bondi Announces Court Filings in $25 Billion National




136. State-Federal Foreclosure Settlement, FLA. OFF. ATT'Y GEN.,
http://myfloridalegal.comL_85256CC5006DFCC3.nsf/0/94816CAD8E86B0778525799F
00595D98?Open&Highlight=0,national,mortgage,settlement,agreement (last visited July
17, 2014).
137. See, e.g., Silver-Greenberg, supra note 29.
138. Peggy P. Lee, Using the National Mortgage Settlement o Help Clients in
Foreclosure, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 16, 17 (2013).
139. Special Inspector General of the Troubled Assets Relief Program ("SIGTARP"),
Christy Romero, issued a memorandum to the Secretary of Treasury documenting
mortgage servicers' erroneous inputting of information into the Net Present Value Test.
Within SIGTARP's judgmental sample of 149 applications that were reviewed for
HAMP modifications between 2009 and early 2011 by three of the largest servicers-
Ocwen, Wells Fargo, and GMAC Mortgage-SIGTARP found that the servicers could
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However, the press releases continue to portray a different narrative.
In a news release, the Florida Attorney General's office cited figures that
more than 23,000 Floridians have received an excess of $1.7 billion in
relief under the NMSA; relief included principal forgiveness, forgiveness
of past forbearance, refinancing, and deficiency waivers. 140
Interestingly, the synopsis does not provide a breakdown of the ratio of
principal forgiveness to deficiency waivers. 141
If the settlement allocation is largely designated to deficiency
waivers, it is essentially meaningless. Specifically, lenders do not pursue
deficiencies as they are, for the most part, uncollectable.142  After a
foreclosure, the debt is no longer secured and could be easily discharged
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.143  Alternatively, the lender will merely
charge off the debt and sell it to a second party debt collector for cents on
the dollar.144  Lastly, the debtor may have the debt discharged in
bankruptcy, and the lender will, nonetheless, sell the debt to a third party
debt collector. 1
45
The chimera of the NMSA has resulted in some disastrous
unintended consequences. For example, borrowers have rejected
provide both accurate inputs and documentation for only two of the HAMP applications.
Memorandum from Christy L. Romero, Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program to Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y of the Treasury, The Net Present Value
Test's Impact on the Home Affordable Modification Program (June 18, 2012)[hereinafter
SIGTARP Memo], available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/NPVReport.pdf.
140. Monitor Issues Interim Report on Relief Provided to Homeowners Under the




141. See generally id.
142. Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Actions Against Homeowners Years After
Foreclosure, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/lenders-seek-court-actions-against-
homeowners-years-after-foreclosure/2013/06/15/3c6a04ce-96fc- 1 e2-b68f-
dc5c4b47e519_story.html ("A recent government audit [of foreclosure deficiency
judgments] found the recovery rate at one-fifth of 1 percent.").
143. Bankruptcy & Deficiency Judgments After Foreclosure, NOLO LAW FOR ALL,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/bankrutpcy-deficiency-judgments-after-
foreclosure.html (last visited July 27, 2014).
144. Karen Weise, The Debt Collection Business Isn't Pretty, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-01/the-
debt-collection-business-isn-t-pretty (noting that "[o]n average, a buyer will pay 40 on
the dollar").
145. Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Prisoners of Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-1 1-0 1/prisoners-of-
debtbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
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affordable monthly payments under HAMP 146 because they want a
principle reduction under the NMSA.147 These borrowers end up losing
their homes when they otherwise could have secured an affordable
modification.148 The rhetoric would have borrowers believe that Pam
Bondi is "work[ing] with the monitor to ensure that
the mortgage servicers fulfill their obligations under
the settlement agreement."149  The political rhetoric preys on the
heuristic biases of borrowers to garner political capital, i.e., positive
media coverage that will hopefully elicit public favor, government funds,
and votes. Borrowers have lost their homes by rejecting bona fide
HAMP modifications because the media has cast the $25 billion NMSA
as a panacea to all borrowers' ills. The rejection of HAMP modifications
serves as a prime example of the signal being lost in the noise of political
rhetoric.
In sum, borrowers could make better decisions regarding debt
obligations if they had access to better information or, in the alternative,
were not misled by politically charged information. This Article
proposes that politicians, attorneys general, and other regulating bodies
should have either: (a) informed borrowers that hey were on their own
(an unlikely scenario) or (b) provided private rights of action under
foreclosure legislature, the NMSA, HAMP, and the OCC Amended
Consent Judgment. Instead, the prevailing political rhetoric appears to
provide borrowers a legal remedy, but in reality affords no private right
of action.
146. This is a heroic achievement in and of itself considering the success rate is 7.6%
nationally. ALYS COHEN ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., AT A CROSSROADS:
LESSONS FROM THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM (HAMP) 8 (2013),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure-mortgage/loan-mod/hamp-
report-2013.pdf.
147. David Dayen, Just 83,000 Homeowners Get First-Lien Principal Reductions
from National Mortgage Settlement, 90 Percent Less Than Promised, NAKED CAPITALISM
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/03/just-83000-homeowners-get-
first-lien-principal-reductions-national-mortgage-settlement-90-percent-less-
promised.html. But see Tom Miller, The National Mortgage Settlement: One Year Later,
NAT'L ASS'N ATT'YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/the-national-mortgage-settlement-one-
year-later.php (last visited July 27, 2014).
148. See Shahien Nasiripour, National Mortgage Settlement Monitor Finds Few
Flaws As Consumer Advocates Cry Foul, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/national-mortgage-settlement-
monitor n 3463180.html ("The banks are systematically violating the terms of the
National Mortgage Settlement.") (quoting Josh Zinner, co-director of the Neighborhood
Economic Development Advocacy Project in New York).
149. Monitor Issues, supra note 140.
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3. Equivocating Risk and Uncertainty
In the housing boom, ratings agencies were able to disguise
uncertainty as risk by stamping a triple-A rating on a tranche of mortgage
backed securities. 50 This resulted in a seemingly unquenchable thirst for
mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives. The influx of money
incentivized investment banks to further leverage themselves.1 5' The
more leveraged a bank is, the more money that can be made; conversely,
increased leverage leads to increased exposure to financial ruin. For
example, in 2007, Lehman Brothers had a leverage ratio of 33 to 1.152
This means that Lehman Brothers held $1 for every $33 in financial
positions.153  Hence, shocks in the housing market resulted in
catastrophic financial consequences. Similarly, the Florida Legislature's
ideological stubbornness, failure to accept uncertainty, and reliance on
specialists rather than engaging in a more multi-disciplinary approach
has unnecessarily leveraged its socioeconomic future.
Securitization was thought to usher in a new era of risk allocation.
Specifically, securitization was able to tranche risk and allow risk-
adverse investors to accept the most risk. However, these securities
failed to adequately account for the collective action problems that would
result upon default. For example, upon default the collateral may be
sufficient to repay senior, but not subordinated, investors in full.
This is in fact the most common default scenario. 54 As an
illustrative hypothetical, Irwin is a Super Senior Tranche ("SST") holder.
In the hypothetical, SST holders consist of ten percent of the mortgage-
backed securities ("MBS") in the loan. The remaining tranche holders
will be considered junior tranche holders and consist of 90 percent of the
investors in the MBS. SSTs are different from junior tranche holders in
that SSTs will be repaid on their investment first.
Assume the following premises are true: (1) the MBS consists of
100 mortgages; (2) each mortgage is valued at $1000; (3) each mortgage
represented the approximate value of the home at purchase; (4) all the
mortgages in the MBS defaulted; and (5) given premises (1) and (2)
150. David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, Tullock on Motivated Inquiry: Expert-
Induced Uncertainty Disguised as Risk, PUB. CHOICE (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1661207 ("What makes expert-induced uncertainty particularly
troublesome is that we may easily confuse it for simple risk...").
151. Banks lend money to individuals and businesses and invest in financial assets.
Banks also borrow money; for example, they issue bonds and take loans, sometimes with
maturity terms as short as a day. If a bank's return on its financial position is greater than
the cost of borrowing, then the bank makes money. See CASSIDY, supra note 24, at 211.
152. SILVER, supra note 6, at 53.
153. Id.
154. Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1867, 1884 (2010).
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above, the total value of the MBS is $100,000. Irwin and the rest of the
SST would benefit most from foreclosing upon its collateral even if the
homes went to foreclosure sale for as low as $100-ten percent of their
original value. One thousand homes going up for foreclosure at $100 is
$100,000, enough to secure a full return for the SST but completely
wiping out the junior interests. Hence, the SST has a strong incentive to
liquidate in order to secure a full return on their investment as opposed to
modifying a debt, which may result in a greater return for all investors. 
1 55
Although modifications may be better for the MBS as a whole-the
homeowner, property values in the surrounding community, and the
housing economy in general-SSTs had a strong incentive to foreclose
on the secured collateral to ensure a full return on their investment. This
and other issues have caused investors to lose an average of $145,000
during a foreclosure compared with less than $24,000 on a modified
loan.156  In sum, the creative risk allocation failed to account for
collective action problems, which ultimately have created significant,
unforeseen negative externalities. 157
Likewise, Florida's Legislature relies on fallacious assumptions that
elicited the current crisis. The legislature has equivocated risk with
uncertainty or, in simpler terms, "known unknowns" and "unknown
unknowns."'15 8 The former can be accessed and insured against through
risk management. The latter covers the ground of uncertainty, and some
theoreticians are hesitant to accept its parameters as such.159 In a world
of information and algorithms, what event cannot be reduced down to a
probability and the risk thereof sufficiently insured against? The
155. Dan Magder, Mortgage Loan Modifications: Program Incentives and
Restructuring Design 9 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 09-13, 2009)
("At least one industry representative has indicated that several large investors with
significant holdings of senior tranches of MBS are working quietly but aggressively (and
effectively) behind the scenes to slow the progress of loan modifications."); Schwarcz,
supra note 154 , at 1893 ("[U]nchecked super-senior investor voting control may well
have contributed to the increase in foreclosures on financial assets underlying the
securities.").
156. Magder, supra note 155, at 9 ("Holders of AAA tranches may prefer
foreclosures since they are shielded from any loss by their seniority."); Schwarcz, supra
note 154, at 1892 ("[S]uper-senior investors usually have contractual power to direct
liquidation in the event of certain contingencies ....").
157. This Article ignores a more in-depth discussion on other collective action
problems including, but not limited to, the influence of bond insurers and or super senior
tranche holders. For further discussion, see Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing
Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L.
REV. 755, 774 (2011).
158. See supra note 6.
159. See, e.g., SILVER, supra note 6, at 53-54. Silver would describe these
theoreticians as Hedgehogs. Building on Isaiah Berlin's classic essay the "Fox and the
Hedgehog," he describes hedgehogs as stubborn, highly specialized, inadaptable, and
intolerant of complexity.
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financial crisis featured some notorious consequences of this type of
theoretical arrogance.
For example, one credit rating agency ("CRA"), Standard and Poor
("S&P"), rated a complex type of security known as a collateralized debt
obligation ("CDO"). S&P rated these CDO's to be AAA, which meant it
had only a one out of 850 (or a 0.12 percent) chance of not paying out
over five years.60 Unfortunately, approximately 28 percent of these
AAA-rated CDO's defaulted; the actual default rates were over 200 times
higher than S&P predicted. 161 In short, a substantial portion of the CDOs
were not sound investments warranting AAA ratings. Thus, Nate Silver
described CRA's ability as an alchemy able to "spin uncertainty in what
feel[s] like risk."
162
The Florida Legislature has reduced the foreclosure crisis into a
simple legislative response that will expedite the foreclosure process,
reduce the foreclosure crisis, and spur economic recovery. Similar to the
S&P's speculative rating of CDOs as AAA, the Florida Legislature's Bill
Analysis is based on non-credible data. 163 Assuming the validity of the
foreclosure data, HB 87 compromises the legal rights of distressed
borrowers and risks alienating Floridians from the legal and political
process.
4. The Illusion of Predictability: Inverse Problems
Along a more systemic analysis, proponents of HB 87 point to the
disparity between the economic recovery in non-judicial foreclosure
states and judicial foreclosure states.164  State law governs real estate
foreclosures. In the United States, there are two predominant means of
foreclosure: judicial and non-judicial foreclosure. 165
The foreclosing party's advantages in non-judicial states are
significant, as compared with judicial states. Alan M. White's Losing the
Paper - Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer
Protection, analyzes the California Court of Appeals decision Gomes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 166 White contends that the Gomes Court
held that "a borrower could not assert a legal challenge to a trustee's sale
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 29.
163. See supra notes 69-104 and accompanying text.
164. Shanklin, supra note 20 ("States that do not require lenders and mortgage
servicers to go through the court system have rebounded faster from the real-estate
downturn than has Florida.").
165. Alan M. White, Losing the Paper - Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and
Consumer Protection, 24 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 468, 472 (2012).
166. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 419 (2011).
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before the sale occurred based on alleged defects in the chain of
ownership of the loan, namely the invalidity of a MERS mortgage
assignment." 
167
White contends that courts in other non-judicial states have
followed suit based on the rationale that a trustee's sale is presumed to be
bona fide and that "it is not the obligation of the trustee to prove to
anyone that it is authorized to foreclose by the proper beneficial owner of
the mortgage."'168 White summarizes the plight of borrowers who reside
in non-judicial states:
[There is a] critical difference between judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure - the borrower cannot simply put the foreclosing party to
its proof in a nonjudicial state. As a result, the ability of borrowers
generally to assert mortgage transfer issues is considerably
diminished in nonjudicial states, simply because of the burden of
going forward. 
169
Non-judicial procedures appear to correlate with economic
recovery, at least in the short-term and at the macroeconomic level. In
judicial foreclosure states, homeowners have greater access to the
judicial process and are better assured their day in court. Homeowners
who take legal action before a foreclosure judgment and sale "can
prevent or delay foreclosure for extended periods of time, and in
significant numbers."17 Thus, the court system requires that plaintiff-
banks prove their right to foreclose, and defendant-homeowners have the
ability to challenge foreclosures, presuming they have a capable attorney.
Based on this analysis, HB 87 appears to be a step towards procedurally
converting Florida into a non-judicial state.
At a general level, the implementation of HB 87 seems to largely
favor the policy goal of utilitarianism over individual rights. At a more
particular level, HB 87 ultimately speeds up the foreclosure process,
thereby compromising the individual rights of distressed borrowers.
While there is some empirical evidence demonstrating that a speedy
resolution to the foreclosure process correlates with a quicker economic
recovery in general, the likelihood of its successful application in Florida
has not been demonstrated. As this Article posits, the risks associated
with HB 87 are not worth any conjectured short-term gain in the housing
economy. It is unfortunate that the same illusion of predictability that
preceded the current foreclosure crisis, similar to the creation of
167. White, supra note 165, at 490.
168. Id. (citing Trotter v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 152 Idaho 842 (Idaho 2012)).
169. White, supra note 165, at 490.
170. Id. at 493.
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subprime mortgage backed securities, is now ironically justifying
rhetorically minimizing the detrimental effects of this illusion.
171
B. Time. A Borrower's Last Procedural Safeguard
Prior to the passage of HB 87, Florida allowed a plaintiff to file a
request for an order to show cause for the entry of final judgment. 172 If
the court found that the complaint was verified and alleged a proper
cause of action, the court had to issue an order directing the defendant
show cause as to why a final judgment should not be entered.173  In
comparison, HB 87 allows any lienholder to initiate the procedure.
174
Thus, HB 87 effectively obviates the regulatory efforts of governmental
entities to curb the unsafe and unsound practices of the nation's largest
servicers.17 5  For example, a servicer's 'obligations to meet certain
evidentiary requirements may be obviated by a secondary lienholder
filing a motion to show cause. HB 87 is an effective shift toward a non-
judicial regime as it reduces the duties of the foreclosing party and shifts
171. The "illusion of predictability" in this context is used to describe the financial
engineering employed in the creation of subprime mortgage backed securities. Subprime
mortgages are those made to borrowers with the following characteristics: a low credit
score, no proof of steady income, and a high debt-to-income ratio. Accordingly, a
subprime mortgage would have difficulty finding a risk-adverse investor on the
secondary mortgage market. Hence mortgage-backed securitization, which aggregated
several subprime mortgages and divided the mortgages into tranches based on their level
of risk, emerged. The safest tranche, typically known as super senior tranche, offered a
low interest rate, but was the first to be paid out of the cash flow. Accordingly, one
subprime mortgage could never garner a triple A-rating, but 3500 pooled together and
tranched based on risk could garner such a rating.
172. H.R. 2013-h0087z.CJS, Reg. Sess., at 4 (Fla. 2013) (citing FLA. STAT. §





175. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE SYS., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY &
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES &
PRACTICES 1 (2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf (noting that in 2010, the four federal bank
regulators-OCC, OTS, FRB, and FDIC-conducted on-site reviews of the foreclosure
policies and procedures of 14 major servicers); Mortgage Servicing: An Examination of
the Role of Federal Regulators in Settlement Negotiations and the Future of Mortgage
Servicing Standards: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer
Credit and the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
112th Cong. 147 (2011) (statement of Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)
[hereinafter Federal Reserve Board Statement] (noting that in July 2010, the Federal
Reserve Board and other bank regulators conducted a horizontal review of same
servicers); U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 28 (noting that five major servicers entered
into a settlement agreement with 49 state attorneys general and the federal government
for unsound and unsafe foreclosure practices).
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burdens of proof and persuasion to the borrower challenging the
foreclosure process. 176
In other words, a party may effectively shift its burden of proof and
persuasion to the defendant-borrower. Moreover, a defense filed as a
response to an order to show cause pleading must currently raise a
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of a
summary judgment or otherwise constitute a valid legal defense to
foreclosure. 177 HB 87 largely ignores the informational barriers inherent
in the foreclosure process that prevent borrowers from identifying errors
that would justify halting the foreclosure process. Andrew J. Kazakes
notes that "[f]oreclosing parties-generally servicers-routinely file
incomplete or unreviewed legal documents with courts, while borrowers
and their advocates simultaneously struggle with those same servicers to
obtain loan documents crucial to foreclosure defense."'1
78
HB 87 purports to ensure due process by providing a hearing to
consider the defendant's motion and arguments. 79 However, this claim
of a hearing as a safeguard is based on the assumption that the defendant
will file competent defenses within the afforded time horizon. HB 87
incorrectly assumes that: (1) homeowners have perfect information upon
which to base financial decisions; (2) homeowners will act rationally to
maximize their own self-interest; and (3) homeowners have the financial
resources to adequately evaluate and pursue the appropriate course of
action. However, borrowers do not have perfect information regarding
the foreclosure itself or the legal repercussions thereof.
In addition, borrowers have limited resources to employ legal and
financial professionals to assist them in the decision-making process.
Similarly, emotionally distressed borrowers are not aptly suited to make
rational and coherent decisions regarding their financial and legal
interests. The only procedural safeguard that Florida's distressed
homeowners have on their side is time.
Time is essential for borrowers to overcome the stigma of
foreclosure and realize that they have rights in the foreclosure process.
In addition, it allows borrowers to assess their finances and determine the
best course of action-whether to pursue legal redress or to look to loss
mitigation alternatives. Lastly, time enables borrowers the ability
rationally to evaluate legal and financial avenues in order to make the
best decision for their families. Time, in other words, allows borrowers
176. See Alexander et al., supra note 120, at 343.
177. FLA. STAT. § 702.10(1)(a)(3) (2011).
178. Kazakes, supra note 112, at 1400.
179. H.R. 2013-h0087z.CJS, Reg. Sess., at 5 (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0087z.C
JS.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber-0087&Session=2013.
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to extricate themselves from the morass of "rational irrationality," as
described by Cassidy:
People aren't stupid, but they don't necessarily know what they really
want or where their best interests lie. The problem is internal and
external. The efficient market/rational expectations approach
assumes transparent self-knowledge: in order to maximize our self-
interests, we must know what they are. But people are often subject
to rival impulses. Their System One brain tells them to plan ahead,
save for retirement, and act cautiously, but their System Two brain
screams at them to enjoy the moment, make a quick buck, and get
ahead of the other fellow. At the same time, as Keynes emphasized,
people's knowledge about he outside world, especially knowledge
about the future, is often strictly limited. Even if they sit down and
try to calculate all the pros and cons of a certain purchase, or
investment, the figures rarely give an unequivocal answer. 180
Florida's current judicial process allows borrowers time to secure
information from servicers via a qualified written request ("QWR").
181
This information may expose servicing abuses that precipitated the
foreclosure or precluded any bona fide modification attempt. Similarly,
the QWR allows borrowers to learn about the obligations that some
servicers have under government programs, HAMP, and the NMSA.
1B 87 effectively eliminates time, often the last beacon of hope for
distressed borrowers. For Posner, the act of "freezing" when confronted
with something risky and unknown has adaptive, evolutionary value. As
Posner phrases it:
Uncertainty aversion is captured in such common expressions as
"fear of change" and "fear of the unknown." These are evolutionarily
plausible emotions, and a common (and again, an evolutionarily
plausible) reaction to them is to freeze. That is a way of gaining time
[italics added] to analyze an uncertain situation and perhaps reduce
its uncertainty .... 182
Assuming HB 87 leads to a speedier economic bargain, it may be a
Faustian bargain of sorts. Namely, borrowers may feel disenfranchised
from homeownership process, and the housing economy may suffer a
resultant chill. After all, the ultimate insurance against the risk of taking
out huge loans to secure housing is judicial intervention. Is the
180. CASSIDY, supra note 24, at 204.
181. Section 2605 of RESPA imposes on loan servicers the duty to timely respond to
inquiries concerning a consumer's mortgage loan whenever the loan servicer "receives a
qualified written request from the borrower (or an agent of the borrower)." 12 U.S.C. §
2605(e)(1)(A) (2012).
182. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 297.
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American dream so strong as to obviate guarding against risk with regard
to the uncertainty involved in assuming long-term debt? If true, this may
be the scariest notion of all. Namely, prospective homeowners would
remain ripe for exploitation and constantly be subject to the unfair
practices of lending and servicing institutions. Further, borrowers would
continue to take on unfavorable loans despite the overwhelming
uncertainty.
Notwithstanding state and federal legislators' attempts to curb
unsafe and unsound lending and servicing practices, the system remains
ripe for exploitation. Unfortunately, the law's aspirational teloi-
certainty, predictability, and uniformity-are also its most susceptible
points. In other words, any stagnant system of law, void of dynamic
judicial interpretation, is capable of being gamed. Ergo, there is a need
for safeguarding the elasticity and contextually based remedial measures
of the judicial system. Judges should be able to look at the facts before
them and make decisions based on substantial justice. As one of its
many unintended consequences, HB 87 would effectively hamstring
judges and reduce foreclosure proceedings to a mere paper trial.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed HB 87 in terms of its constituent elements
and, through legal reasoning, deduced the legal rights and duties created
therefrom. We have used the rights and duties created by HB 87 as
beginning premises from which to infer the competing policies behind
HB 87's rationale. Finally, this Article has attempted an economic
analysis of HB 87's rationale to determine if its pragmatic effects are
consistent therewith.
Drawing from the post-Chicago law and economics movement, this
Article has used tools derived from a pragmatic and reality-based
approach to analyze some of the consequences, intended or not, of the
passing of bills like House Bill 87. The purpose of this Article has not
been to demonize banks, utilitarian policy objectives, or efficiency-based
economic calculations. Rather, it has sought to access the complexities
of using a pragmatic, reality-based approach in the attempt to predict
probable consequences. Overall, this Article has hoped effectively to
engage in a dialogue about some of the significant macroeconomic
ramifications flowing from enacting bills like HB 87.
In summary, this Article has analyzed how Florida's Fair
Foreclosure Act, House Bill 87 ("HB 87"), is a legislative enactment that
aims to expedite the foreclosure process in Florida. In spite of the appeal
of quicker and more expedient closure, this Article has argued that HB
130 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1
87 makes assumptions that will eventually lead to unintended
consequences.
Consequently, this Article ultimately concludes that the uncertain
consequences of the mortgage foreclosure crisis are best mitigated by
affording the time inherent in the legal process and maintaining the
elasticity of courts to make judgments based on interpretative case law
and equity.
